Anonymous v. Google by New York Supreme Court
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF NEW YORK 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------x 
Anonymous, an Infant above the age of fourteen, by her 
father and natural guardian, Anonymous, for an Order 
pursuant to Section 3102 (c) of the Civil Practice Laws 




Google, Inc.,  
 








AFFIRMATION IN  
SUPPORT OF ORDER  









Russell Bogart, an attorney duly admitted to practice before the Courts of the State of 
New York, affirms under penalty of perjury, pursuant to Civil Practice Laws and Rules 
(“CPLR”) § 2106, as follows: 
1. I am a partner in the law firm of Hoffman Polland & Furman, PLLC and represent 
Petitioner Anonymous (“Petitioner”) in the above-captioned petition.  I am familiar with the facts 
and circumstances set forth in this affirmation.  I make this affirmation in support of Petitioner’s 
application for an Order, pursuant to CPLR §3102(c), for pre-action disclosure against the 
Respondent Google, Inc. (“Google”), directing Google to preserve and disclose the Registrant 
Information and IP Address Information pertaining to the email address mgulelo@gmail.com 
(“GMAIL account”). 
2. The Petitioner is a sixteen-year old minor.  Petitioner is also an A student and 
ranked by the United States Tennis Association as one of the top forty female tennis players in 
her age group in New York state.  As a high school junior, Petitioner also has contacted a 
number of prestigious colleges and universities about possible athletic and/or academic 
scholarships.  Petitioner had posted on a website devoted to the recruiting of tennis players the 
colleges that she is interested in attending. 
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3. To the Petitioner’s horror and humiliation, she has discovered that an individual 
pseudonymously using the GMAIL Account (hereinafter the “Defendant”) has transmitted 
defamatory emails to a number of the tennis coaches at the universities that she had listed on the 
tennis recruiting website as schools she was interested in attending.  In December 2013, a tennis 
coach from an academically prestigious university forwarded to the Petitioner’s high school 
coach an email sent by the Defendant about her.  A second university tennis coach also has 
informed the Petitioner’s parents, through an intermediary, of the receipt of a similar email.  
Based on the facts discussed below, Petitioner fears that she has only uncovered the tip of the 
iceberg in terms of the harm that the Defendant has attempted to inflict, or is inflicting, upon her. 
4. To say the least, the email communications impugn the integrity, character and 
fitness of the Petitioner.  In a December 16, 2013 email transmitted to one university tennis 
coach, the Defendant wrote “I want to inform you of a current high school junior that has your 
school on the list of schools she wants to apply to next year.”  The Defendant further explained 
that the Petitioner “has your school as ‘High Interest’ on the Tennis Recruiting website.” 1 
5. The Defendant then stated that to protect the “school’s best interests,” the 
Defendant was warning the school that the Petitioner is “Someone you most certainly do not 
want to be a team member on your school’s women’s tennis.”  The Defendant further indicated 
that the Petitioner “cheats any chance she gets (not only in tennis).”  The Defendant further 
accused the Petitioner, inter alia, of “having a very disrespectful attitude towards both” her 
teammates and coaches, exhibiting extremely poor sportsmanship, of accusing the coaches of 
being “corrupt and unfair” and that “Badmouthing others is most definitely her very strong 
asset.”  The email further charges that the Petitioner is only a mediocre student and tennis player. 
                                                 




6. Tellingly, as the university coach told the Petitioner’s high school coach in a 
December 17, 2013 email:  
“I personally think it may be important for [Jane Doe] to know that 
someone is sending these emails out about her and I think it is troubling 
that someone would go to these lengths” (emphasis added).   
 
7. The circumstances strongly indicate that the Defendant sent similar defamatory 
communications to other tennis programs that the Petitioner had expressed interest in on the 
Tennis Recruiting website, along with other third parties.  Thus, absent obtaining pre-action 
discovery tailored toward identifying the Defendant, the Petitioner will be unable to bring a legal 
action against the Defendant for damages and/or to curtail the malicious conduct. 
Understandably, upon learning of the conduct perpetrated against her, Petitioner has suffered 
significant emotional harm in addition to the obvious harm to her reputation. 
8. The publication of Petitioner’s true name in the public record inevitably would 
subject this teenager to further unwanted publicity and further exacerbate the harm caused to her 
emotionally, along with to her reputation.  Accordingly, to minimize such harm, Petitioner has 
filed this Petition utilizing the pseudonym “Jane Doe.” See, e.g.,  Doe v. N.Y.U., 6 Misc.3d 866 
(Sup.Ct. N.Y. Co. 2004) (anonymous filings permitted in “compelling situations” involving 
“highly sensitive matters” including “social stigmatization,” or “where the injury litigated against 
would occur as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity”).  The infant Petitioner is 
aware of the filing of this Petition and has requested that her parents assist her in pursuing this 
pre-action discovery because of the fear of harm that the Defendant has placed her in. 
THE STANDARD FOR OBTAINING PRE-ACTION DISCLOSURE 
9. Pursuant to CPLR §3102(c), a court is permitted to issue an order allowing a party 
to obtain discovery, pre-action, to aid in bringing an action or to preserve information.  See 
Matter of Uddin v. New York City Transit Authority, 27 A.D.3d 265, 266 (1
st
 Dep’t 2006).  “A 
petition for pre-action discovery should only be granted when the petitioner demonstrates that he 
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or she has a meritorious cause of action and that the information sought is material and necessary 
to the actionable wrong.” Id.  New York Courts have awarded pre-action discovery where 
necessary to determine the identity of bloggers who have posted defamatory material.  See, e.g., 
Cohen v. Google, Inc., 25 Misc. 3d 945, 948, 887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
10. As one court aptly observed when deciding whether discovery was warranted of 
the identity of an anonymous blogger: 
In that the Internet provides a virtually unlimited, inexpensive, and almost 
immediate means of communication with tens, if not hundreds, of millions 
of people, the dangers of its misuse cannot be ignored. The protection of 
the right to communicate anonymously must be balanced against the need 
to assure that those persons who choose to abuse the opportunities 
presented by this medium can be made to answer for such transgressions. 
Those who suffer damages as a result of tortious or other actionable 
communications on the Internet should be able to seek appropriate redress 
by preventing the wrongdoers from hiding behind an illusory shield of 
purported First Amendment rights.  
 
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372 (Va.Cir.Ct.), revd. on 
other gds, 261 Va. 350, 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va.Sup.Ct.2001)  
PETITIONER POSSESSES MERITORIOUS CAUSES OF ACTION 
11. Petitioner possesses a meritorious cause of action for defamation against the 
Defendant.  To assert a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff needs to allege the issuing of 
“a false statement, published without privilege or authorization to a third-party, constituting fault 
as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and, it must either cause special harm or 
constitute defamation per se.”  Dillon v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 34, 38 (1st Dep’t. 1999). 
Statements can be defamatory if they “tend[ ] to expose a person to hatred, contempt or aversion, 
or to induce an evil or unsavory opinion of [her] in the minds of a substantial number of the 
community.”  Golub v. Enquirer/Star Group, Inc., 89 N.Y.2d 1074, 1076 (1997). 
12. Here, the email communications, by accusing the Petitioner of cheating “any 
chance she gets (not only in tennis),” are libelous per se as they charge the Petitioner, a minor, in 
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writing of being a liar and are thus actionable on their face. Divet v Reinisch, 169 A.D.2d 416, 
417 (1st Dept 1991).  As the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569 (1977), comment g explains: 
It is actionable per se to impute to another in libelous form conduct that 
tends to lower the other's reputation for veracity or honesty, irrespective of 
whether the conduct constitutes a criminal offense and irrespective of 
whether it tends to affect the trade, business or profession of the other. 
Thus it is actionable so to accuse another of the crime of perjury, larceny 
or embezzlement, or to make any derogatory imputation of fact 
concerning another's veracity or integrity. Statements that another has 
cheated or taken unfair advantage in a business transaction or that he has 
in any way defrauded others, as by refusing to pay his debts, are within the 
rule stated in this Section. 
 
13. The emails further suggest that the Defendant is aware of undisclosed facts – such 
that the Petitioner has cheated academically or is sexually promiscuous – which purportedly 
support the claim that the Petitioner “cheats any chance she gets.” See e.g., Qureshi v St. 
Barnabas Hosp. Ctr., 430 F.Supp 2d 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The actionable element of a 
“mixed opinion” is not the false opinion itself—it is the implication that the speaker knows 
certain facts, unknown to [her] audience, which support [her] opinion and are detrimental to the 
person about whom [s]he is speaking”); Arias-Zeballos v Tan, 2008 WL 833225 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 28, 2008) (“Tan's statements to Fasano-that Zeballos “cheated” Tan and is “dangerous”-are 
capable of being characterized as true or false. To the extent it could be argued that calling 
someone “dangerous” expresses an opinion, the statement is still actionable stated alone and 
without any justification, it implies the existence of undisclosed facts warranting the conclusion 
that Zeballos is a dangerous person”).  Significantly, these false statements were not issued in the 
context of a public debate, but rather were sent to targeted individuals in a manner designed to 
interfere with the Petitioner’s professional aspirations. 
14. The statements also were maliciously transmitted to each college tennis program 
that the Petitioner had expressed a desire to attend thereby satisfying the “fault” requirement to 
support a defamation claim.  The defamatory statements were designed to inflict pecuniary harm 
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upon the Petitioner by interfering with the Petitioner’s opportunity to procure university 
scholarships (i.e., prospective economic advantage) and ultimately to interfere with her 
educational and professional aspirations.  
15. “The elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are 
(i) extreme and outrageous conduct, (ii) an intent to cause—or disregard of a substantial 
probability of causing—severe emotional distress, (iii) a causal connection between the conduct 
and the injury, and (iv) the resultant severe emotional distress.” Lau v. S & M Enterprises, 72 
A.D.3d 497, 498, 898 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010), leave to appeal dismissed in part, 
denied in part, 16 N.Y.3d 767, 944 N.E.2d 654 (2011). 
16. Here, the Defendant has engaged in the outrageous conduct of attempting to 
blacklist the Petitioner from obtaining a college athletic scholarship through the secret 
dissemination of defamatory emails accusing her of deceit and unfitness.  The extreme nature of 
the Defendant’s conduct is confirmed by one tennis coach’s comment about the disturbing 
lengths to which the Defendant had resorted to harm the Petitioner.  The extreme and outrageous 
nature of the harm is further shown by the Petitioner’s status as a minor and the apparent pattern 
of behavior at issue.  Indeed, upon learning about these events, the Petitioner has expressed to 
her parents that she is now “fearful” of attending school. 
17. An Order from this Court directing Google to disclose the Registrant and IP 
Address information pertaining to the GMAIL account is necessary to identify this individual. 
18. On January 15, 2014, the Petitioner’s mother sent an email addressed to the 
GMAIL Account requesting that the Defendant contact her to discuss the Defendant’s 
communications about the Petitioner.  No response was received.   
19. On March 3, 2014, Petitioner’s counsel sent an email to the GMAIL Account 
warning of the Petitioner’s intent to file this motion for pre-action discovery.  In response, 
Google sent a notification that the GMAIL account has been shut down. 
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20. Specifically, Petitioner requests that Google be required to disclose: 
All subscriber and/or account registration information for the user of the 
GMAIL Account from July 1, 2013 to the present, including but not 
limited to, name, address, phone number, additional verification email 
addresses, access logs, any sign-in IP address information, including the 
IP address utilized at the time of account creation. 
 
21. Absent an award of the aforementioned pre-action discovery, the Petitioner will 
not be able to pursue any legal action against the Defendant. 
22. The Petitioner has not made any prior request for relief from this Court. 
WHEREFORE, for the above stated reasons, it is respectfully requested that the relief requested 
by Petitioner be granted in all respects, with all additional relief that is fair and just. 
Dated: New York, New York 




      HOFFMAN POLLAND & FURMAN PLLC 
 
 
       /s/ Russell Bogart 
      By: __________________________________ 
       Russell Bogart, Esq. 
       Attorneys for Petitioner 
       220 East 42
nd
 Street, Suite 435 
       New York, New York 10017 
       Tel.:  (212) 338-0700 
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